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Abstract
We empirically study the determinants of failures of microfinance institutions
based on the CAMELS rating components and microfinance-specific measures
by applying probit regression techniques. Our findings confirm the capital ade-
quacy (C), the asset quality (A), the management capability (M), the earnings (E),
and the sensitivity to market risk (S) as explaining factors of failures of microfi-
nance institutions. Regarding microfinance-specific effects, there is a positive in-
fluence of the percentage of female borrowers on the likelihood of failure. More-
over, we find evidence that regulation, the presence of donations, and the rapid
growth of an MFI affect the probability of failure.
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1. Introduction
The myth that microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate successfully even
without proper management structures has persisted for a long time (Armendáriz
and Morduch, 2010, p. 347). However, Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) argue
that efficient management structures are of great importance regarding the success
or failure of an MFI. Their view is supported by a more frequent observation of
MFI failures after the financial crisis of 2008/2009 due to poor portfolio quality
or weak management (see e.g. Rozas, 2009, 2011).
MFIs differ from standard banks. They mainly operate in developing countries
granting loans to poor entrepreneurs, often without any collateral. Bruton et al.
(2013) stress the importance of entrepreneurship as a tool for poverty reduction.
However, sufficient amounts of funding required to operate their businesses are
unavailable for many microentrepreneurs. Contrary to commercial banks, MFIs
are willing to meet the financing needs of microenterprises (see Khavul et al.,
2013, p. 31).
Many MFIs focus on female clients. Moreover, in microfinance, various or-
ganizational types can be found. Not all MFIs are organized as banks, but as
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), credit unions, or non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), to name the most important possibilities. Another important
difference between standard banks and MFIs is that not every MFI is allowed to
collect deposits. Furthermore, as many MFIs pursue a social mission they often
receive donations. As a consequence, insights on bank failures from traditional
banking literature may not be applicable to MFIs. Deepening the knowledge on
failures of MFIs is therefore crucial for regulators, investors, depositors, microen-
trepreneurs, and other stakeholders of these institutions. This article is the first to
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investigate the failures of MFIs systematically.
For our analysis, we use annual balance sheet and income statement data on
1,797 MFIs in 117 countries from 1995 until 2011, which we replenish with infor-
mation regarding financial distress derived from extensive online investigations.
To detect failed MFIs, we examine breaks in the data history. We identify doc-
umented failures, e.g., MFIs that have been closed by a legal authority due to
bankruptcy, defaulted on a loan, undergone a restructuring process, or were forced
to merge with another MFI due to financial distress.
In banking literature, there is a vast body of evidence that can be found on
bank failures. Many investigations focus on US banks and use the CAMEL(S)
rating components as exogenous variables. CAMELS is an acronym for capital
adequacy, asset quality, management capability, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity
to market risk. While older studies focus on the five CAMEL rating components,
more recent analyses (e.g., Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013) often employ the sen-
sitivity to market risk as an additional element as well. For example, Thomson
(1991) examines predictors of bank failures for the period from 1982 until 1989,
basing his proxy variables on the elements of the CAMEL rating. Using balance
sheet and income statement data, he conducts a logit regression for subsamples
regarding the time to failure and detects several predictors for bank failure. For
example, the return on assets of a bank serves as a predictor for failure. Banks
with a lower return on assets are more likely to fail. The definition for bank fail-
ure varies across different studies. In addition to bank failures, Wheelock and
Wilson (2000) investigate acquisition hazards using a hazard model in the period
from 1984 until 1993. Furthermore, they use two definitions of failure. The first
definition regards the closure of a bank by the regulatory authority and the second
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definition expands the first definition by including banks with a ratio of total eq-
uity less goodwill to total assets of less than or equal to two percent. The findings
of Wheelock and Wilson (2000) also show a significant negative influence of the
return on assets on failure. Jin et al. (2011) explore the accounting and the audit
quality as predictors for bank failures, which they detect by examining a list pub-
lished online by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and find a negative
relationship between the reputation of the auditor and failure.
There are also studies analysing bank distress outside the United States. For
example, Arena (2008) explores bank failures in nine East Asian countries for
the period from 1995 until 1999 and six Latin American countries for the period
from 1992 until 1996 using a cross-sectional multivariate logit model. His defi-
nition of failure again differs from the previously mentioned studies. Männasoo
and Mayes (2009) investigate 19 Eastern European transmission economies for
the period from 1995 until 2004 by applying a survival model. Moreover, they
provide a brief summary of further studies on bank failures (e.g., Whalen, 1991;
González-Hermosillo et al., 1997) including the various definitions for bank fail-
ures or distress. The findings of the studies described by Männasoo and Mayes
(2009) are similar. The capital asset ratio, the earnings variables, and the liquidity
ratio appear to be negatively related to failure and there is a positive relationship
between the measures for asset risk and failure.
In microfinance literature, to our knowledge Rozas (2009) and Rozas (2011)
are the only studies to describe MFI failures in a case study style. In both studies,
the author reveals several reasons for the failing of MFIs, such as fraud by the
managers or a growth that is too rapid. Furthermore, there is some literature on
aspects related to the failure of MFIs, e.g. the management of MFIs and the fi-
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nancial performance (see, e.g., Hudon, 2010), the governance (see, e.g., Mersland
and Strøm, 2009), or MFI ratings (see, e.g., Beisland and Mersland, 2012).
Other previous research in the field of microfinance investigates several effects
of different measures on performance indicators, e.g., financial revenue, sustain-
ability, outreach or the portfolio quality of MFIs. D’Espallier et al. (2011) exam-
ine whether MFIs with a focus on female borrowers exhibit a better repayment
performance. They analyse a global data set on rating data of 350 MFIs via panel
regressions. Their findings demonstrate that MFIs with a larger share of female
borrowers exhibit a better asset quality in terms of portfolio at risk, loan write-off
rate, and provision expense rate. Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) investigates perfor-
mance differences between MFIs with a different legal status. His results indicate
that the portfolio at risk of private companies is significantly lower than it is for
cooperatives and NGOs. Furthermore, Assefa et al. (2013) examine the effect of
competition, measured by a self-constructed Lerner index, on performance indi-
cators. Their results show a positive relationship of competition with the portfolio
at risk and the write-off ratio. Baquero et al. (2012), who examine the influence
of competition, observe contradictory results on micro loan interest rates and the
portfolio at risk. They reveal that the portfolio at risk of for-profit MFIs is lower
in more competitive markets. Dorfleitner et al. (2013) examine determinants of
microcredit interest rates and find a positive relationship between the loan loss
rate and the lending rate charged by MFIs from their borrowers.
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, we investigate whether the
findings from the standard banking literature (mainly the CAMELS components)
can be confirmed when explaining failures of MFIs. Our results suggest that sev-
eral bank-specific variables identified to determine failures in the traditional bank-
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ing literature also explain failures of MFIs, e.g., capital adequacy and portfolio
quality. Second, due to the difference between traditional banks and MFIs, we
also analyse the microfinance-specific determinants of MFI failures. For exam-
ple, we find that a higher fraction of female borrowers is associated with a higher
probability of failure.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
data, hypotheses, and methodology. Section 3 presents the results. It contains
detailed descriptive statistics, several probit models, robustness checks, and dis-
cusses the results by comparing our findings with previous research on traditional
banks. Finally, Section 4 concludes and provides suggestions for further research.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. Data
Data sources. Our data set combines three data sources. Data concerning MFIs
were obtained from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) through the
web-based information platform MIX Market, which makes a variety of self-
reported indicators from MFIs openly available. However, these data lack cru-
cial measures such as donations received by MFIs. Therefore, we include data
on MFI income statements that were also obtained from MIX. As we addition-
ally wish to control for the influence of country-specific effects on MFI failures,
we add macroeconomic indicators obtained from the World Bank. All three data
sources consist of panel data on an annual basis for the period between 1995 and
2011. Due to data inconsistencies, we carefully clean the data obtained from the
MIX Market from unrealistic values, for example, a portfolio at risk, share of fe-
male borrowers, average loan size, asset value or liquid assets smaller than zero,
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replacing them with missing values.
Identifying failures. Additionally, information on MFI failures was collected
through extensive online research. As of January 2013, 964 out of 2,370 MFIs
ceased reporting to MIX Market at some point in time. The change in this report-
ing behaviour could either be attributed to a merger or a failure of the MFI or it
stopped reporting for other reasons, e.g., lack of personnel or time. We analysed
the reasons for the break in the reporting history of every MFI that stopped report-
ing to MIX Market. We classify these MFIs as failed, non-failed, and unsolved
with respect to a reference year and in accordance with the two failure definitions
shown in Section 2.2. The reference year is the point in time with a failure indica-
tion, i.e., the breaks in the reporting history. The classification algorithm is shown
in the Appendix. We exclude the 264 MFIs whose situation remains unsolved
from the analysis, when we analyse the strict definition of failure. Section 2.2
provides detailed descriptions of both definitions of failure.
Cross-sectional indicators. Although panel data are available, the implementa-
tion of panel regression techniques is not suitable due to the limited number of
failures. Therefore, we construct cross-sectional indicators for all variables of in-
terest by aggregating the MFI’s data over the last three years – but over a minimum
of 2 years – available before the reference year, by using the average value. We
regard institutions reporting an average loan size larger than 15,000 USD as not
being focused on microfinance. To avoid distortion, we exclude the corresponding
observations from the data set.
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2.2. Definitions of failure
The strict definition (FAILURE1), which we employ for our main analyses,
comprises documented failures. Therefore, we investigated extensively, mainly
via online research, whether the reason for the discontinued data history of an
MFI was a merger or a failure. MFIs are categorized as having failed if they
were actually liquidated by a legal authority due to bankruptcy, defaulted on a
loan or were merged with other MFIs after financial distress. Financial distress
is indicated by a capital asset ratio of less than or equal to two percent. Merged
MFIs with a capital asset ratio of more than two percent are not regarded as having
failed according to our strict definition. Additionally, we found nine MFIs that
underwent restructuring and continued reporting afterwards. These MFIs also
fall into the category of failed MFIs. The category of non-failed includes those
MFIs that are no longer engaged in microfinance after ceasing to report to MIX or
those MFIs who represent temporary microfinance projects that were expectedly
terminated.
As a robustness check, we explore an additional extended definition of failure
(FAILURE2) following Wheelock and Wilson (2000). According to this defini-
tion, an MFI is regarded as non-failed, if it reports a capital asset ratio of more
than two percent in the last year with data available in the data history on MIX
Market between 1995 and 2011. Consequently, an MFI is categorized as having
failed if the MFI has a capital asset ratio of less than or equal to two percent in
the last year it reported upon. In these cases, we anticipate the time of failure to
be the point in time at which the capital asset ratio first falls below the mentioned
threshold and does not recover afterward. If the capital asset ratio time series of
an MFI consists only of values below the threshold, we cannot determine the year
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of the anticipated failure and consequently exclude this MFI from the sample.
The extended definition additionally includes all MFIs that failed according to the
strict definition.
Since both failure definitions require information on the capital asset ratio,
which is also an explanatory variable (see below), we generally apply the follow-
ing principle: For each MFI we decide whether a failure or a non-failure has been
observed at some point in time. To explain these events in the regression ana-
lyses, we strictly use variables from at least one year before the observed failure
or non-failure. While, due to this procedure, we lose some observations because
of inadequately short time series before the anticipated or actual failure event, its
benefit is that the regression analyses do not suffer from self-inflicted endogeneity.
Dependent on the failure definition applied, the data used to calculate the cross
sectional indicators also vary for some MFIs. Hence, we distinguish between the
two data sets FAILURE1 data and FAILURE2 data referring to the failure defi-
nition that is used to determine failures in the data. Table 1 presents the number
of MFIs per country and the number of failed MFIs according to the strict and
extended definition of failure. Note that the distribution of the observations over
the countries is very imbalanced.
2.3. Explanatory variables and hypotheses
As the aim of this paper is to investigate whether the CAMELS components
explain failures of MFIs and to determine additional microfinance-specific fac-
tors, we follow the traditional bank failure literature (e.g., Thomson, 1991; Arena,
2008; Männasoo and Mayes, 2009) and additionally include microfinance-specific
variables to derive the possible determinants of failure.
As a proxy for capital adequacy, we use the capital asset ratio. We would
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Table 1: Number of MFIs per country and number of failures according to the strict (FAILURE1)
and extended (FAILURE2) definition.
No. MFIs No. MFIs
FAILURE1 FAILURE2 FAILURE1 FAILURE2
Country total failed total failed Country total failed total failed
Afghanistan 17 4 17 6 Macedonia 4 0 4 0
Albania 6 0 6 0 Madagascar 13 0 12 0
Angola 2 0 2 0 Malawi 6 0 7 0
Argentina 18 0 17 0 Malaysia 1 0 1 0
Armenia 12 0 13 0 Mali 16 1 17 2
Azerbaijan 24 0 22 0 Mexico 66 1 64 1
Bangladesh 72 0 61 2 Moldova 4 0 4 0
Belarus – – 1 0 Mongolia 6 0 7 0
Belize 1 0 1 0 Montenegro 4 0 3 0
Benin 25 0 18 2 Morocco 11 1 11 1
Bhutan 1 0 1 0 Mozambique 8 0 9 0
Bolivia 25 0 25 0 Myanmar (Burma) 1 0 1 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 16 1 15 1 Namibia 2 0 2 0
Brazil 30 0 25 1 Nepal 38 0 40 0
Bulgaria 20 0 25 0 Nicaragua 32 5 32 6
Burkina Faso 13 0 9 0 Niger 8 0 10 0
Burundi 5 0 4 0 Nigeria 50 4 46 4
Cambodia 17 0 16 0 Pakistan 30 0 30 4
Cameroon 21 0 20 1 Palestine 8 0 8 0
Central African Republic 1 0 1 0 Panama 4 0 3 0
Chad 2 0 2 0 Papua New Guinea 2 0 2 0
Chile 5 0 5 0 Paraguay 7 0 7 0
China, People’s Republic of 34 0 30 3 Peru 65 0 67 1
Colombia 37 0 34 0 Philippines 98 1 96 2
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 11 0 14 1 Poland 4 0 3 0
Congo, Republic of the 4 0 4 0 Romania 6 0 6 0
Costa Rica 15 0 15 0 Russia 29 0 59 3
Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 17 0 9 0 Rwanda 21 0 7 0
Croatia 2 0 2 0 Saint Lucia 1 0 – –
Dominican Republic 13 1 13 1 Samoa 1 0 1 1
East Timor 3 0 3 0 Senegal 21 0 20 3
Ecuador 57 0 55 1 Serbia 4 0 4 0
Egypt 14 0 14 1 Sierra Leone 9 0 10 0
El Salvador 16 0 17 1 Slovakia 1 0 1 0
Ethiopia 21 0 18 0 South Africa 10 0 8 0
Fiji 1 0 – – South Sudan 4 0 3 0
Gabon 1 0 1 0 Sri Lanka 23 0 23 0
Gambia, The 2 0 2 0 Sudan 2 0 2 0
Georgia 13 0 12 0 Suriname 1 0 – –
Ghana 52 0 44 1 Swaziland 1 0 1 0
Grenada 1 0 – – Syria 3 0 3 1
Guatemala 22 0 22 0 Tajikistan 36 0 32 0
Guinea 7 0 7 1 Tanzania 15 1 15 1
Guinea-Bissau 4 0 2 1 Thailand 3 0 2 0
Haiti 7 0 6 0 Togo 13 1 12 3
Honduras 23 0 23 0 Tonga 1 0 1 0
Hungary 1 0 1 0 Trinidad and Tobago 2 0 2 0
India 146 12 146 20 Tunisia 1 0 1 0
Indonesia 31 1 52 1 Turkey 2 0 2 0
Iraq 12 0 12 0 Uganda 23 1 23 1
Jamaica 3 0 3 0 Ukraine 3 0 3 0
Jordan 8 0 8 0 Uruguay 2 1 2 1
Kazakhstan 22 1 30 1 Uzbekistan 18 0 30 0
Kenya 27 2 25 2 Vanuatu 1 0 – –
Kosovo 11 0 10 0 Venezuela 2 0 2 0
Kyrgyzstan 24 0 33 0 Vietnam 23 0 19 0
Laos 3 0 3 0 Yemen 9 0 8 2
Lebanon 5 0 5 0 Zambia 7 0 6 0
Liberia 3 0 2 0 Zimbabwe 5 0 5 0
Total 1797 39 1782 85
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expect MFIs with a higher capital asset ratio to be less likely to fail. The portfolio
at risk (30 days), the portfolio at risk (90 days), the loan loss rate, and the write-off
ratio are commonly used measures for the portfolio quality in microfinance (see,
e.g. Cull et al., 2007; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010; D’Espallier et al., 2011; Ahlin
et al., 2011; Assefa et al., 2013) and serve as different proxies for asset quality.
There should be a positive relationship between the proxies for (bad) asset quality
and the probability of failure. The ratio of borrowers per staff member is a proxy
for management capability. This measure is generally not employed in studies on
traditional bank failures. However, Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) emphasise
that the motivation of staff members is an important factor for the management
capability of an MFI. We suggest a negative relationship between borrowers per
staff member and the probability of failure because MFIs with a higher number of
borrowers per staff member are expected to operate more efficiently.
We consider the return on assets, the profit margin, and the net operating in-
come as measures for the earnings of an MFI. MFIs with higher earnings are as-
sumed to be less likely to fail. We employ the liquid assets as a proxy for liquidity
and expect the failure probability to be lower for MFIs with a higher ratio of liquid
assets. In line with Kerstein and Kozberg (2013), who investigate interest bearing
deposits to total assets as a proxy for the sensitivity to market risk, we analyse the
effect of deposits to total assets on the probability of failure. Contrary to Kerstein
and Kozberg (2013), we expect a lower probability of failure with higher levels of
deposits in the context of microfinance. Not all MFIs collect deposits. Only if an
MFI meets certain criteria concerning its type or regulation is it allowed to take
deposits from its clients. However, deposits are an inexpensive source of funding
compared to debt from international investors. The dependence on international
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capital markets is lower for MFIs that collect deposits. Therefore, the interest rate
risk decreases for MFIs with higher levels of deposits. Moreover, these MFIs may
also face a lower currency risk.
The fact that not all MFIs are able to offer deposits marks one of several dif-
ferences between MFIs and standard banks. Accounting for these differences, we
additionally examine microfinance-specific factors. We assume the percentage of
female borrowers, donations, regulation, and growth effects to have an influence
on the failure probability of an MFI. The discussion about gender effects is a well-
known topic in microfinance. According to D’Espallier et al. (2011), MFIs with
a higher fraction of female borrowers display a better repayment performance.
However, Hermes et al. (2011) argue that MFIs focusing on women operate less
efficiently. We expect the share of female borrowers to have a positive impact on
the failure probability of an MFI after controlling for the overall asset quality.
Another important difference to standard banking is that many MFIs receive
donations. On the one hand, donations increase the equity of MFIs and reduce the
pressure on an MFI to operate efficiently. Hence, this effect may cause donations
to be positively associated with the event of failure. On the other hand, there could
also be a negative relationship between donations and the probability of failure if
donors determined certain requirements regarding the operations of an MFI. Fur-
thermore, if an MFI is accompanied by a donor, it is very likely that the donor will
help the MFI in times of financial distress. To observe the relationship between
donations and the failure probability we include either a donations dummy or the
relative donations divided by average assets, respectively.
Contrary to traditional banks, not all MFIs are subject to some form of regula-
tion. However, regulation may reduce the likelihood of failure. Hence, we expect
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a negative relationship between the regulation dummy and the probability of fail-
ure. Moreover, Rozas (2011) mentions fast, uncontrolled growth of MFIs as being
a reason for some of the MFI failures that he studies. To examine whether such
an effect holds true after controlling for other effects, we proxy the growth of an
MFI with the average growth rate of the number of an MFI’s borrowers (NBdev).
In summary, our empirical analyses focus on the following five hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The CAMELS components affect the probability of failure.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). There is a positive relationship between the percentage of
female borrowers and the probability of failure.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Donations have an influence on the likelihood of failure.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Regulated MFIs are less likely to fail.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). The growth rate of an MFI in terms of number of borrow-
ers is positively related to the probability of failure.
Further explanatory variables include several MFI-specific and macroeconomic
control variables. The average assets are included to control for the size of the
MFI. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the respec-
tive MFI operates for-profit. We also include a dummy variable for the region
Latin America and the Caribbean. The MFI types in our data sample are BANK,
NGO, NBFI, credit union (CU), and OTHER1. We control for the type of MFI by
including a dummy variable for the type NGO.
1The category OTHER includes rural banks and MFIs that do not provide information on the
type on MIX Market.
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We also include macroeconomic control variables in our analysis, for example,
the GDP per capita, the GDP growth, a measure for the competition, and a proxy
for the agricultural production in a country (CropI). This measure considers, for
example, crop shortfalls due to natural disasters. To account for the overall poverty
level in a country, we include the poverty rate. We follow Cull et al. (2007) and
employ the average loan size as a proxy for the poverty level of the borrowers
of an MFI. Additionally, we include the Gini index to capture the distribution of
income in the country where the MFI is located. All variables are defined in detail
in Table 2.
2.4. Limitations of the data set
Several previous empirical studies mention selection bias issues related to
MIX Market data (see, e.g., Bauchet and Morduch, 2010; Assefa et al., 2013).
Indeed, it is not unlikely that our data set comprises larger and more mature MFIs
because reporting to MIX Market is voluntary for MFIs. Hence, a great number
of MFIs possibly is neither able nor willing to contribute to MIX Market, which
could be the case for small and/or young MFIs in particular. However, as our
analyses focus on MFIs that intend to attract investors and as the MFIs providing
information not only aim to enhance transparency2 but also look for new sources
of financing, we argue that the MFIs reporting to MIX are most likely representa-
tive of those MFIs which seek financing.
Additional concerns may arise due to the fact that smaller and less mature
MFIs, which we cannot capture in our data set, might tend to fail more often in
2While transparency is of special importance to investors, other stakeholders, for example
depositors or microentrepreneurs, may possibly rely on other factors enhancing the confidence in
a certain MFI.
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Table 2: Definition of variables.
Variable Description
CAP Capital asset ratio Total equity divided by total assets. Source: MIX Market.
PAR Portfolio at risk Measures the unpaid principal of loans on which installments have been 30 days (or 90 days) past due
and is based on the total outstanding credit balance. Source: MIX Market.
LLR Loan loss rate Value of loans written off less value of recovered loans divided by average gross loan portfolio.
Source: MIX Market.
WOR Write off ratio Obtained by dividing the value of non-collectable loans by the average gross loan portfolio. Source:
MIX Market.
Borrowers per staff member Borrowers per staff member Number of active borrowers divided by number of personnel. Source: MIX Market.
ROA Return on assets Net operating income less taxes divided by average assets. Source: MIX Market.
Profit margin Profit margin Net operating income divided by financial revenue. Source: MIX Market.
NOI Net operating income Net operating income divided by average total assets. Source: Derived from MIX income statements.
Liquid assets Liquid assets Non-earning liquid assets divided by average total assets. Source: Derived from MIX Market.
Deposits/Total Assets Deposits/Total Assets Deposits in USD divided by the total assets. Source: Derived from MIX Market.
WB Women ratio Share of MFI borrowers that are female. Source: MIX Market.
Donations/Average Assets Donations Donations in USD divided by the average total assets. Source: Derived from MIX income statements.
Donations (dummy) Donations Indicates whether an MFI receives donations. MFIs with no information are included in the reference
category. Dummy variable. Source: Derived from MIX income statements.
Regulated (dummy) Regulation Indicates whether an MFI is subject to the supervision of a regulatory authority. Dummy variable.
Source: MIX Market.
NB Number of borrowers Number of active borrowers. Source: MIX Market.
NBdev NB growth rate NBdev is the average discrete rate of increase of an MFI’s number of active borrowers. Source:
Derived from MIX Market.
Assets Average total assets Average value of total assets at the start and end of the reporting period in USD. Source: Derived from
MIX Market.
AVLS Average loan size Average gross loan portfolio in USD divided by the number of borrowers of the institution. Source:
MIX Market.
For-profit (dummy) Profit status Indicates if an MFI operates for profit or not (non-profit). The non-profit category includes MFIs with
no information. Dummy variables. Source: MIX Market.
Type Type of institution Legal status of the MFI: Credit union (CU), Bank (BANK), non-bank financial institution (NBFI),
non-governmental organization (NGO), other (OTHER). Dummy variables. Source: MIX Market.
Region Region The geographical regions are Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), Africa (AFRICA), South Asia (SA), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), and
East Asia and the Pacific Area (EAP). Source: MIX Market.
GDPpc Gross domestic income per
capita
USD value of gross domestic income of the country, in which the MFI mainly operates, divided by its
midyear population. Source: World Bank data.
GDP growth GDP growth Annual growth of GDP per capita in percent. Source: World Bank data.
CropI Crop Index The crop production index accounts for the agricultural production, with the exception of fodder
crops, for each year and country. Base period: 2004–2006. Source: World Bank data.
Gini index Gini index Measure for income inequality. Source: World Bank data.
Comp Competition Reciprocal of the summed squares of the MFI market shares. The market shares are calculated as the
number active borrowers of an MFI divided by the number of active borrowers in each country based
on the MIX data.
Poverty rate Poverty rate Headcount below national poverty line in the country the MFI operates divided by the total
population. Source: World Bank data.
Shares Value of shares traded Total value of stocks traded divided by GDP. Source: World Bank data.
Credit Domestic credit provi- ded by
financial sector
Domestic credit provided by financial sector divided by GDP. Source: World Bank data.
OE Operating expenses Operating expense divided by average assets. Employed as instrument in probit regressions with
endogenous regressors. Source: MIX Market.
Lending interest rate Lending interest rate Country’s lending interest rate. Employed as instrument in probit regressions with endogenous
regressors. Source: World Bank data.
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comparison to their peers represented at MIX Market. However, because of the
lack of information, we are not able to consider these MFIs in our investigation.
Again, as we are only interested in the MFIs that wish to attract potential investors,
the MFIs not reporting to MIX Market are not in the scope of our investigation.
Furthermore, for our regression analyses it is not necessary to identify the correct
proportion of failed MFIs among all MFIs. The analyses solely require the failed
MFIs of our sample to be representative for failed MFIs in general. The data
show no indication contrary to this assumption. Moreover, we exclude unsolved
cases regarding the FAILURE1 data set to avoid misspecification of failures. To
conclude, although a certain sample selection bias exists, we are confident of the
representativeness of our data set concerning the intended analyses.
2.5. Methodology
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for MFI failures. We estimate
regression models with the following probit specification:
probit {P(yi = 1|X)}= βXi + εi, (1)
where X is a vector of explanatory variables concerning MFI i and εi∼N(0,σ2e ) is
an individual residual. We apply Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent
standard errors in all regressions.
Probit models are frequently used to determine the factors influencing fail-
ures of traditional banks (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1998; Reynaud, 2010; Ker-
stein and Kozberg, 2013). Other regression techniques comprise logit models
(e.g., Thomson, 1991; Arena, 2008; Cole and White, 2012; Jin et al., 2011), the
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linear probability model (e.g., Poghosyan and Cˇihak, 2011), and survival models3
(e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Arena, 2008; Auvray and Brossard, 2012).
There are several MFIs that do not report all variables required for the ana-
lyses. Because failures are already rare events in our data sample, we follow
D’Espallier et al. (2011) and impute metric variables with their means to prevent
the loss of these observations.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 3 shows the frequencies of failed and non-failed MFIs according to the
strict (column 2–4) and extended (column 5–7) definition of failure for the cate-
gorical variables. The FAILURE1 data set includes 39 failed and 1758 non-failed
MFIs while the FAILURE2 data set consists of 85 failed and 1697 non-failed
MFIs. Although it is possible that our data set may be biased regarding the size
due to the usage of MIX Market information, as mentioned in Section 2.4, the ma-
jority of MFIs operates on a non-profit basis in both failure samples. Over 40% of
the MFIs receive donations.
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the metric variables of the full
sample (Panel A) and the sample of failed MFIs (Panel B) according to the strict
definition. Table 5 exhibits the full sample (Panel C) and the sample of failed
MFIs (Panel D) according to our extended definition.
3We are not able to estimate survival models because we cannot determine the failure date.
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Table 3: Frequencies for categorical variables based on the unimputed data sets for the strict
(FAILURE1) and extended (FAILURE2) definition of failure. The variables are defined in Table 2.
FAILURE1 FAILURE2
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Type
Bank 157 4 161 145 4 149
Credit Union 295 5 300 312 15 327
NBFI 498 17 515 483 20 503
NGO 646 11 657 588 43 631
Other 162 2 164 169 3 172
Region
Africa 440 10 450 374 23 397
East Asia and the Pacific 218 2 220 220 7 227
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 270 2 272 323 5 328
Latin America and The Caribbean 447 8 455 427 13 440
Middle East and North Africa 72 1 73 67 5 72
South Asia 311 16 327 286 32 318
Regulated
No 654 18 672 652 41 693
Yes 1,026 21 1,047 979 42 1,021
No information 78 0 78 66 2 68
Operational self-sufficiency
No 513 22 535 448 49 497
Yes 1,136 17 1,153 1,155 33 1,188
No information 109 0 109 94 3 97
Profit status
Non-profit 991 21 1,012 964 64 1,028
Profit 666 15 681 645 17 662
No information 101 3 104 88 4 92
Deposits
No 600 14 614 561 27 588
Yes 990 16 1,006 933 31 964
No information 168 9 177 203 27 230
Donations
No 861 24 885 836 39 875
Yes 733 14 747 712 42 754
No information 164 1 165 149 4 153
Total 1,758 39 1,797 1,697 85 1,782
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for metric variables based on the unimputed data set for the strict
definition of failure (FAILURE1). The variables are defined in Table 2.
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel A: Full sample 1797
CAP 1758 0.314 0.291 −3.639 0.137 0.243 0.457 1.000
WOR 1542 0.022 0.048 −0.010 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.577
LLR 1620 0.018 0.046 −0.323 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.563
PAR30 1572 0.081 0.126 0.000 0.017 0.046 0.094 2.350
PAR90 1401 0.055 0.085 0.000 0.009 0.029 0.063 0.933
OE 1641 0.195 0.181 0.000 0.095 0.145 0.236 2.782
Borrowers per staff member 1724 134.723 259.006 0.000 56.000 101.000 157.167 8191.667
ROA 1642 −0.009 0.154 −2.930 −0.016 0.015 0.043 0.577
Profit margin 1662 −0.098 0.753 −9.656 −0.100 0.086 0.194 1.423
NOI 1666 −0.008 0.152 −2.930 −0.018 0.018 0.048 0.485
Deposits/Total Assets 1590 0.244 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.466 0.973
Liquid assets 1517 0.170 0.131 0.000 0.080 0.136 0.222 0.846
NB (in thousands) 1747 56.982 361.502 0.000 1.634 6.579 23.036 7498.742
NBdev 1514 0.415 3.823 −0.966 −0.022 0.109 0.320 142.000
Assets (mn USD) 1767 36.337 167.286 0.000 0.900 3.276 13.738 3553.838
AVLS 1735 1133.627 1816.088 1.000 156.500 440.333 1260.500 14825.000
Donations/Average Assets 1644 0.037 0.149 −0.035 0.000 0.000 0.010 3.472
WB 1537 0.637 0.267 0.000 0.424 0.623 0.897 1.000
DQI 1797 0.176 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.314 0.941
GDPpc 1784 2715.224 2753.615 121.014 762.747 1251.168 3865.162 17142.119
Comp 1793 6.660 4.403 1.000 3.442 5.161 10.754 21.839
CropI 1782 109.752 13.199 62.140 102.335 109.130 116.360 215.285
Poverty rate 1061 32.652 12.927 2.900 24.900 32.367 39.800 80.700
Domestic credit provided by financial sector 1706 45.410 30.387 −19.142 22.695 42.006 60.829 184.570
Value of shares traded 1289 20.300 32.806 0.002 1.102 4.386 20.398 157.419
Gini index 1106 42.238 8.693 26.975 33.380 42.980 48.713 67.400
Lending interest rate 1449 15.441 9.514 5.396 10.833 13.783 17.973 203.961
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1784 3.370 2.854 −9.410 1.303 3.263 4.987 21.722
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel B: Failed MFIs 39
CAP 39 0.144 0.180 −0.206 0.058 0.120 0.245 0.713
WOR 36 0.032 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.035 0.243
LLR 38 0.031 0.049 −0.007 0.000 0.014 0.034 0.243
PAR30 37 0.124 0.121 0.000 0.033 0.080 0.175 0.438
PAR90 29 0.112 0.131 0.000 0.009 0.047 0.185 0.466
OE 39 0.199 0.158 0.019 0.089 0.134 0.290 0.666
Borrowers per staff member 36 167.370 137.090 16.500 72.500 117.667 236.833 466.333
ROA 39 −0.050 0.135 −0.509 −0.128 −0.015 0.038 0.177
Profit margin 37 −0.289 0.710 −2.489 −0.601 −0.065 0.124 1.024
NOI 37 −0.050 0.136 −0.450 −0.097 −0.014 0.042 0.185
Deposits/Total Assets 29 0.116 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.071 0.694
Liquid assets 30 0.207 0.157 0.007 0.091 0.177 0.302 0.692
NB (in thousands) 38 177.950 447.208 0.521 5.364 12.842 84.175 2233.332
NBdev 35 0.569 1.331 −0.490 −0.051 0.170 0.696 6.683
Assets (mn USD) 39 52.879 99.307 0.042 0.992 6.011 39.053 397.776
AVLS 38 784.781 1181.023 36.000 146.000 227.500 1073.000 4761.333
Donations/Average Assets 38 0.040 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.376
WB 36 0.734 0.262 0.130 0.590 0.724 1.000 1.000
DQI 39 0.154 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.294 0.471
GDPpc 39 1467.031 1722.690 255.298 447.961 1119.172 1176.748 9402.997
Comp 39 7.313 4.417 1.000 2.920 5.467 11.711 15.667
CropI 39 104.064 11.279 67.415 99.850 105.120 114.287 116.360
Poverty rate 25 35.437 10.165 9.000 29.800 36.800 39.000 61.700
Domestic credit provided by financial sector 39 46.704 27.684 2.402 17.268 60.016 70.341 96.037
Value of shares traded 26 38.301 34.986 0.002 6.266 26.923 76.168 85.057
Gini index 18 38.031 8.080 27.820 29.740 38.285 46.160 50.550
Lending interest rate 35 15.936 12.127 7.600 11.278 13.511 16.440 83.468
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 39 4.057 3.080 −5.900 1.947 3.932 5.729 8.834
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for metric variables based on the unimputed data set for the extended
definition of failure (FAILURE2). The variables are defined in Table 2.
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel C: Full sample 1782
CAP 1770 0.335 0.259 −0.565 0.144 0.255 0.478 1.000
WOR 1506 0.020 0.041 −0.019 0.000 0.005 0.022 0.556
LLR 1598 0.020 0.172 −0.079 0.000 0.003 0.017 6.695
PAR30 1538 0.072 0.127 0.000 0.013 0.042 0.087 3.506
PAR90 1341 0.048 0.072 0.000 0.009 0.027 0.059 0.980
OE 1628 0.198 0.204 0.000 0.094 0.144 0.235 2.782
Borrowers per staff member 1707 127.609 227.763 0.000 53.500 95.000 154.333 8191.667
ROA 1629 −0.005 0.171 −2.930 −0.011 0.017 0.046 0.577
Profit margin 1652 −0.064 0.695 −7.744 −0.066 0.094 0.206 1.049
NOI 1656 −0.000 0.150 −2.930 −0.012 0.019 0.051 0.559
Deposits/Total Assets 1548 0.251 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.492 0.999
Liquid assets 1476 0.166 0.132 0.000 0.076 0.132 0.220 0.846
NB (in thousands) 1729 51.455 330.800 0.000 1.386 5.968 21.009 7498.742
NBdev 1493 0.573 5.068 −0.789 −0.012 0.112 0.326 142.000
Assets (mn USD) 1772 35.147 165.318 0.000 0.803 3.026 12.768 3553.838
AVLS 1714 1176.367 1840.928 1.000 164.667 475.333 1308.667 14486.000
Donations/Average Assets 1640 0.046 0.209 −0.035 0.000 0.000 0.011 3.999
WB 1499 0.632 0.268 0.000 0.423 0.620 0.886 1.000
DQI 1782 0.177 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.314 0.941
GDPpc 1770 2757.898 2784.989 98.821 762.747 1328.934 3979.047 14202.633
Comp 1779 6.655 4.417 1.000 3.440 5.170 10.834 22.496
CropI 1769 108.595 13.082 67.000 101.493 107.913 115.785 215.285
Poverty rate 1054 32.307 13.665 2.900 22.950 31.510 39.800 76.400
Domestic credit provided by financial sector 1704 43.973 29.379 −20.813 22.617 41.905 60.016 183.328
Value of shares traded 1316 20.645 32.365 0.000 1.201 5.608 22.958 179.438
Gini index 1134 41.805 8.553 26.975 33.710 42.760 48.713 63.140
Lending interest rate 1449 15.477 9.254 5.310 10.833 13.737 17.973 188.104
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1770 3.516 3.064 −14.314 1.503 3.435 5.364 27.261
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel D: Failed MFIs 85
CAP 85 0.156 0.195 −0.206 0.049 0.094 0.225 1.000
WOR 67 0.034 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.037 0.361
LLR 72 0.032 0.058 −0.007 0.000 0.011 0.033 0.361
PAR30 72 0.158 0.417 0.000 0.019 0.070 0.182 3.506
PAR90 53 0.097 0.118 0.000 0.008 0.047 0.150 0.466
OE 73 0.214 0.179 0.019 0.109 0.149 0.240 0.850
Borrowers per staff member 78 132.346 108.515 0.000 70.667 99.917 163.000 466.333
ROA 73 −0.069 0.160 −0.793 −0.116 −0.028 0.026 0.177
Profit margin 80 −0.363 0.796 −4.265 −0.582 −0.172 0.114 1.024
NOI 80 −0.067 0.151 −0.685 −0.098 −0.028 0.024 0.185
Deposits/Total Assets 57 0.143 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.180 0.822
Liquid assets 57 0.188 0.149 0.007 0.068 0.150 0.273 0.692
NB (in thousands) 81 93.411 316.103 0.000 2.054 8.520 25.608 2233.332
NBdev 75 0.568 1.679 −0.490 −0.051 0.128 0.665 12.167
Assets (mn USD) 85 27.945 71.425 0.000 0.660 2.363 17.748 397.776
AVLS 80 633.754 1052.417 19.000 127.750 213.417 536.167 5514.333
Donations/Average Assets 81 0.052 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.609
WB 75 0.704 0.269 0.102 0.498 0.695 0.993 1.000
DQI 85 0.224 0.191 0.000 0.000 0.235 0.353 0.647
GDPpc 85 1567.164 1812.760 166.996 535.108 1076.789 1189.717 9402.997
Comp 85 6.798 4.555 1.000 3.178 5.059 11.711 21.839
CropI 85 103.630 10.404 67.415 99.350 102.703 114.287 120.920
Poverty rate 49 36.434 12.698 9.000 29.800 36.800 40.000 71.300
Domestic credit provided by financial sector 85 44.635 32.260 −1.934 18.600 45.490 66.285 145.080
Value of shares traded 53 45.282 43.529 0.002 6.651 42.823 76.168 179.438
Gini index 42 38.575 7.735 27.820 32.140 38.805 44.430 55.890
Lending interest rate 68 15.051 10.550 5.310 11.278 12.908 16.017 83.468
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 85 3.988 2.992 −5.900 1.627 3.932 5.729 9.185
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Concerning the CAMELS-rating components, the capital adequacy of the av-
erage failed MFI appears to be worse than the capital adequacy of the average MFI
in the respective full sample. Furthermore, the proxies for the (bad) asset qual-
ity (PAR30, PAR90, LLR, and WOR) appear to be higher for the average failed
MFI (Panel B and D) than for the average MFI in Panel A and C. The proxies
for the earnings exhibit negative values for ROA, profit margin, and NOI. How-
ever, the earnings measures are lower for the MFIs in Panels B and D compared to
the full sample (Panel A and C). The measure for liquidity is higher in the failed
MFIs samples than in the respective full samples. This result is consistent with
the descriptive findings of Koetter et al. (2007), who analyse the determinants of
distressed and non-distressed bank mergers. In their sample, distressed acquired
banks show the highest liquidity. In contrast, the average MFI in the full sample
exhibits a larger share of deposits relative to total assets than the average failed
MFI. Among the MFI-specific variables, the most outstanding differences include
the average number of borrowers, the fraction of female borrowers, and the aver-
age outstanding balance.
Table 6 presents Bravais–Pearson correlation coefficients for the metric ex-
ogenous variables based on the imputed data sets. To avoid multicollinearity, we
use solely the portfolio at risk (30 days) and the loan loss rate to proxy (bad) asset
quality, and the return on assets to measure earnings in the regression analyses.
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Table 6: Bravais–Pearson correlation coefficients for metric exogenous variables based on the
imputed data sets. The symbols *, **, and *** express significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. The variables are defined in Table 2.
FAILURE1 data set (N = 1797)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1. CAP 1.00
2. WOR 0.01 1.00
3. LLR 0.07*** 0.93*** 1.00
4. PAR30 −0.04 0.26*** 0.21*** 1.00
5. PAR90 −0.05** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.73*** 1.00
6. Borrowers per staff member −0.02 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.01 0.03 1.00
7. ROA 0.12*** −0.18*** −0.17*** −0.10*** −0.09*** 0.02 1.00
8. Profit margin 0.09*** −0.21*** −0.20*** −0.11*** −0.09*** 0.04 0.65*** 1.00
9. NOI 0.17*** −0.19*** −0.17*** −0.10*** −0.09*** 0.02 0.94*** 0.69*** 1.00
10. Liquid assets −0.04* 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.15*** −0.01 −0.12*** −0.15*** −0.13*** 1.00
11. Deposits/Total Assets −0.33*** −0.08*** −0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** −0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.25*** 1.00
12. WB −0.06** −0.05** −0.04 −0.14*** −0.08*** 0.13*** −0.03 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.17*** 1.00
13. Donations/Average Assets 0.10*** 0.04 0.04* −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.65*** −0.45*** −0.65*** 0.07*** −0.10*** 0.01
14. NBdev 0.04* −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.02 −0.03 −0.08*** −0.04 0.01 −0.03 −0.02
15. logaAssets −0.18*** 0.02 0.04 −0.07*** −0.05** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.05** 0.18*** −0.13***
16. log(AVLS) −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.24*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.08*** −0.10*** 0.17*** −0.56***
17. GDPpc 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.07*** −0.03 −0.05** −0.04* −0.05** 0.02 −0.05** −0.20*** −0.15*** −0.14***
18. GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.01 −0.15*** −0.14*** −0.09*** −0.05** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** −0.01 −0.03 0.05**
19. CropI −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.06*** −0.06** 0.03 0.04* 0.01 0.04* −0.05** 0.02 0.09***
20. Gini index 0.02 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.02 0.02 −0.03 0.01 −0.04 −0.10*** 0.09*** −0.07***
21. Comp −0.16*** −0.07*** −0.05** −0.06** −0.01 0.04* 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** −0.03 0.10*** 0.19***
22. Value of shares traded 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 −0.03 0.09*** −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.07*** −0.18*** 0.16***
23. Poverty rate 0.00 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.01 −0.02 −0.05* −0.02 −0.07*** −0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.02
24. Domestic credit provided by financial sector 0.04* 0.01 0.01 −0.03 0.01 0.07*** −0.04 0.06** −0.03 −0.14*** −0.22*** 0.18***
13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
13. Donations/Average Assets 1.00
14. NBdev 0.01 1.00
15. logaAssets −0.19*** −0.04* 1.00
16. log(AVLS) −0.12*** 0.03 0.36*** 1.00
17. GDPpc 0.01 −0.01 0.13*** 0.43*** 1.00
18. GDP per capita growth (annual %) −0.00 0.06*** −0.10*** −0.16*** −0.20*** 1.00
19. CropI −0.05** −0.00 0.18*** −0.05** −0.12*** 0.12*** 1.00
20. Gini index −0.01 −0.01 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.28*** −0.22*** −0.08*** 1.00
21. Comp −0.10*** −0.03 0.11*** −0.14*** −0.15*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 1.00
22. Value of shares traded −0.02 0.13*** −0.02 −0.15*** 0.01 0.35*** 0.12*** −0.05* 0.03 1.00
23. Poverty rate 0.01 0.00 −0.05** −0.06** −0.10*** −0.21*** −0.11*** 0.25*** 0.05** −0.06*** 1.00
24. Domestic credit provided by financial sector −0.05** 0.07*** 0.02 −0.10*** 0.17*** 0.18*** −0.02 0.04 −0.02 0.57*** −0.21*** 1.00
FAILURE2 data set (N = 1782)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1. CAP 1.00
2. WOR 0.04* 1.00
3. LLR 0.04 0.22*** 1.00
4. PAR30 −0.03 0.20*** 0.04* 1.00
5. PAR90 −0.03 0.22*** 0.05** 0.59*** 1.00
6. Borrowers per staff member −0.03 0.25*** 0.05** 0.04* 0.08*** 1.00
7. ROA 0.04* −0.20*** −0.02 −0.07*** −0.06** 0.02 1.00
8. Profit margin −0.01 −0.22*** −0.04 −0.08*** −0.07*** 0.04* 0.60*** 1.00
9. NOI 0.10*** −0.22*** −0.03 −0.08*** −0.07*** 0.02 0.83*** 0.71*** 1.00
10. Liquid assets −0.01 0.10*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.10*** −0.01 −0.09*** −0.14*** −0.11*** 1.00
11. Deposits/Total Assets −0.40*** −0.12*** −0.03 0.06** 0.06** −0.06*** 0.04* 0.06*** 0.05** 0.21*** 1.00
12. WB −0.03 −0.01 0.02 −0.08*** −0.02 0.14*** −0.04* −0.04* −0.03 −0.01 −0.17*** 1.00
13. Donations/Average Assets 0.12*** 0.02 −0.00 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.74*** −0.39*** −0.54*** 0.04* −0.08*** 0.04
14. NBdev 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.05** −0.04* 0.01 −0.04 −0.03
15. logaAssets −0.26*** 0.06*** −0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.15*** −0.11***
16. log(AVLS) −0.04* −0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.23*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.09*** −0.09*** 0.18*** −0.55***
17. GDPpc 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.00 −0.03 −0.05** −0.03 −0.03 0.00 −0.05* −0.21*** −0.08*** −0.12***
18. GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.01 −0.14*** −0.01 −0.10*** −0.07*** 0.02 0.03 0.06** 0.06** −0.05** −0.04 0.02
19. CropI −0.06** −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.05* −0.03 −0.00 0.12***
20. Gini index −0.00 0.14*** 0.01 0.04* 0.00 0.04* −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 −0.10*** 0.06** −0.01
21. Comp −0.23*** −0.05** −0.03 −0.03 0.04* 0.05** 0.05** 0.09*** 0.07*** −0.01 0.10*** 0.21***
22. Value of shares traded 0.03 −0.04 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 0.09*** −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.07*** −0.15*** 0.17***
23. Poverty rate 0.04* 0.10*** 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.04* −0.09*** −0.04 −0.01 −0.06*** 0.04*
24. Domestic credit provided by financial sector 0.08*** 0.01 −0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.11*** −0.00 0.05* 0.01 −0.11*** −0.21*** 0.18***
13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
13. Donations/Average Assets 1.00
14. NBdev 0.01 1.00
15. logaAssets −0.20*** −0.07*** 1.00
16. log(AVLS) −0.14*** 0.01 0.35*** 1.00
17. GDPpc −0.02 −0.02 0.15*** 0.43*** 1.00
18. GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.03 0.08*** −0.12*** −0.09*** −0.14*** 1.00
19. CropI −0.10*** −0.01 0.24*** −0.05** −0.09*** 0.06** 1.00
20. Gini index −0.05** −0.03 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.27*** −0.25*** −0.04 1.00
21. Comp −0.06*** −0.04* 0.10*** −0.16*** −0.13*** 0.05** 0.10*** 0.16*** 1.00
22. Value of shares traded −0.01 0.08*** −0.01 −0.15*** 0.02 0.31*** 0.13*** −0.07*** 0.05** 1.00
23. Poverty rate 0.04 0.01 −0.06*** −0.09*** −0.11*** −0.23*** −0.07*** 0.29*** 0.05** −0.05** 1.00
24. Domestic credit provided by financial sector −0.05** 0.03 0.06*** −0.10*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.54*** −0.20*** 1.00
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3.2. Regression analysis
Table 7 shows the results of the estimated probit models for the strict defini-
tion of MFI failure based on the imputed data set. Several studies on bank fail-
ures solely employ the CAMEL(S)-rating components in their regression analyses
(e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1998; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006). Hence, model specifi-
cation (I) includes the CAMELS components with neither MFI-specific variables
nor control variables. To account for the differences between MFIs and traditional
banks, model specification (II) contains the microfinance-specific variables related
to our hypotheses H2–H5 derived in Section 2.3. Again, no further explanatory
variables are involved. Instead of the dummy variable indicating whether the MFI
receives donations, model specification (III) includes the relative donations. Other
studies on bank failure employ a measure for the size as additional control variable
(e.g., Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). In line with this literature, model specifica-
tion (IV) controls for the size by containing the average total assets. Following
Thomson (1991), Männasoo and Mayes (2009), and Poghosyan and Cˇihak (2011),
who employ additional control variables, model specification (V) accounts for all
control variables described in Section 2.3. All model specifications are estimated
employing Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors.
All coefficients of the CAMELS components, except for the liquidity, show
the expected sign. Our results show a significant negative relationship between
the proxy for capital adequacy, i.e. CAP, and FAILURE1 across all model spec-
ifications. The coefficient of the first proxy for the (bad) asset quality, PAR30, is
positive and significant in model (I) to (V). While the coefficient of the second
proxy for (bad) asset quality shows the expected positive sign it is only signif-
icant in model specifications (II), (III), and (V). The proxy for management ca-
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Table 7: Coefficients of the probit models. The dependent variable is the FAILURE1 dummy. The
regression is performed using Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** express significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. The variables are defined in Table 2.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
CAMELS components
CAP −0.808*** −0.804*** −0.786*** −0.811*** −0.816***
(0.220) (0.218) (0.218) (0.216) (0.233)
PAR30 0.641* 0.680* 0.729** 0.852** 0.858**
(0.346) (0.355) (0.365) (0.371) (0.400)
LLR 1.464 1.909* 1.735* 1.634 2.054*
(1.045) (1.024) (1.035) (1.071) (1.230)
Borrowers per staff member (in thousand) −0.0122 −0.0749 −0.0586 −0.124 −0.200*
(0.119) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.111)
ROA −0.0784 −0.177 −0.202 −0.436 −0.821**
(0.367) (0.328) (0.566) (0.299) (0.406)
Liquid assets 0.930* 0.891* 0.830 0.889 0.394
(0.538) (0.538) (0.537) (0.543) (0.666)
Deposits/Total Assets −0.996*** −0.933*** −0.915*** −0.940*** −1.185***
(0.315) (0.313) (0.317) (0.309) (0.366)
MFI-specific variables
WB 0.593* 0.560* 0.686** 0.862**
(0.310) (0.306) (0.308) (0.413)




Regulated 0.0281 0.0519 −0.0415 −0.276*
(0.134) (0.139) (0.135) (0.165)
NBdev 0.00625 0.00710 0.00772 0.00769












GDPpc (in thousand USD) −0.168**
(0.0685)










Constant −1.873*** −2.224*** −2.293*** −3.769*** −0.483
(0.133) (0.277) (0.276) (0.674) (1.088)
Observations 1797 1797 1797 1797 1797
Failures 39 39 39 39 39
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.096 0.090 0.115 0.240
AIC 361.6 363.9 365.9 358.6 331.8
pability, borrowers per staff member, appears to have a significant influence on
FAILURE1, in the model specification including all control variables. Hence, the
higher the management capability, the lower the probability of failure.4 The mea-
4Note that a high value for the deposits to total assets indicates a low sensitivity to market risk.
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sure for the earnings is negative across all model specifications. It is significant
when control variables additional to size are included. The proxy for liquidity
does not show the expected negative sign. However, liquidity does not seem to
have a significant effect on the probability of failure in model specifications (III)–
(V). Concerning the measure for the sensitivity to market risk, all model spec-
ifications indicate a significant negative relationship between the sensitivity and
FAILURE1. Regarding our hypotheses, we observe evidence supporting H1 con-
cerning the capital adequacy (C), the asset quality (A), the management capability
(M), the earnings (E), and the sensitivity to market risk (S).
Concerning the microfinance-specific variables, the fraction of female borrow-
ers, WB, is positive and significant across all model specifications. Therefore, an
MFI is more likely to fail if it has a higher ratio of female borrowers. This is con-
sistent with our expectations in Section 2.3. Hence, our results provide evidence
in favour of H2. Although there is evidence that MFIs with a focus on female
microfinance clients show better repayment rates (see D’Espallier et al., 2011),
our finding regarding H2 is consistent with the conclusions of previous studies
in the field of microfinance. For example, as already mentioned in Section 2.3,
Hermes et al. (2011) reveal a negative effect of the focus on female borrowers on
the efficiency of an MFI. The coefficients of the donations dummy and the relative
donations are negative in all model specifications. The finding regarding the do-
nations dummy is significant in model (V) when all control variables are included.
Therefore, there is evidence to support H3. The coefficient of the dummy indi-
cating regulation is significant in model specification (V). Thus, our main results
supply evidence approving H4. Finally, the rapid growth proxy NBdev shows a
positive coefficient in all specifications, although this finding is not significant.
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Hence, we find no evidence in favour of H5 regarding our main model (V).
3.3. Robustness analysis
To assess the robustness of our results, we conduct further regressions. First,
we investigate the extended definition of failure. Model specifications (R.I)–(R.V)
in Table 8 represent the respective results corresponding to the models in Table 7
with FAILURE2 as dependent variable. All model specifications are estimated
employing Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors.
The results regarding the proxies for the CAMELS components are similar
to the model specifications with FAILURE1. The only differences arise regard-
ing the asset quality and the management capability. While we are able to detect
a positive relationship between PAR30 and the probability of failure, the coeffi-
cient of LLR is insignificant. However, it shows the expected sign. Similarly,
our results show no significant effect of the management capability on the likeli-
hood of failure in the FAILURE2 sample. In terms of the MFI-specific variables,
none of the coefficients is significant, except for the positive coefficient of WB
in model (R.III). Moreover, there are differences regarding the signs of several
coefficients, for example, NBdev.
Table 9 displays additional robustness checks regarding the FAILURE1 data
set. Model specification (R.VI) corresponds to model (V) but is estimated em-
ploying country-clustered standard errors. Furthermore, we add several control
variables to model specification (V) that measure the development of the financial
system in a country (models R.VII and R.VIII), namely the value of shares traded
and the domestic credit provided by the financial sector divided by GDP. More-
over, we conduct several subsample regressions. While model specification (R.IX)
regards a subsample without NGOs, model (R.X) solely explores MFIs that do not
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Table 8: Coefficients of the probit models. The dependent variable is the FAILURE2 dummy. The
regression is performed using Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** express significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. The variables are defined in Table 2.
(R.I) (R.II) (R.III) (R.IV) (R.V)
CAMELS components
CAP −2.163*** −2.151*** −2.118*** −2.188*** −2.027***
(0.443) (0.446) (0.454) (0.438) (0.426)
PAR30 1.704*** 1.800*** 1.699*** 1.802*** 1.945***
(0.477) (0.478) (0.483) (0.476) (0.491)
LLR 0.197 0.197 0.180 0.184 0.156
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.121)
Borrowers per staff member (in thousand) −0.132 −0.192 −0.194 −0.140 −0.227
(0.111) (0.156) (0.141) (0.115) (0.215)
ROA −0.459* −0.403* −1.003** −0.331 −0.454**
(0.242) (0.242) (0.494) (0.242) (0.210)
Liquid assets 0.666 0.592 0.599 0.633 0.294
(0.420) (0.429) (0.425) (0.431) (0.480)
Deposits/Total Assets −1.182*** −1.076*** −1.072*** −1.094*** −1.081***
(0.218) (0.233) (0.233) (0.234) (0.287)
MFI-specific variables
WB 0.369 0.388* 0.337 0.239
(0.227) (0.229) (0.229) (0.304)




Regulated −0.0581 −0.0707 −0.0349 −0.0760
(0.119) (0.118) (0.116) (0.147)
NBdev −0.00256 −0.00367 −0.00443 −0.00669












GDPpc (in thousand USD) −0.0662*
(0.0384)










Constant −1.104*** −1.358*** −1.322*** −0.831* 0.517
(0.133) (0.219) (0.215) (0.492) (0.860)
Observations 1782 1782 1782 1782 1782
Failures 85 85 85 85 85
Pseudo-R2 0.149 0.154 0.157 0.157 0.222
AIC 597.2 601.7 599.9 602.1 577.6
receive donations. Model specification (R.XI) shows the probit regression coeffi-
cients for a subsample excluding small banks in terms of average assets (< 5 mn
USD). The results of model specifications (R.VI)–(R.VIII) appear to be robust in
terms of the CAMELS components, while the value of shares traded has a signifi-
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Table 9: Robustness checks employing the FAILURE1 data set. Coefficients of the probit models
based on model specification (V). The dependent variable is the FAILURE1 dummy. Model (R.VI)
employs country-clustered standard errors, models (R.VII)–(R.XI) are performed using Eicker–
Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols
*, **, and *** express significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variables are
defined in Table 2.
Additional financial mar-
ket development controls Subsample regressions
Country- Without MFIs without Without
clustered SE Shares Credit NGOs donations small MFIs
(R.VI) (R.VII) (R.VIII) (R.IX) (R.X) (R.XI)
CAMELS components
CAP −0.816*** −0.810*** −0.821*** −1.072*** −1.116*** −1.766***
(0.270) (0.232) (0.234) (0.308) (0.298) (0.552)
PAR30 0.858** 0.784** 0.848** 0.843** 1.091** 2.701**
(0.372) (0.398) (0.402) (0.410) (0.515) (1.068)
LLR 2.054* 1.966 2.079* 3.255** 2.712 1.060
(1.193) (1.224) (1.241) (1.350) (2.221) (2.946)
Borrowers per staff member (in thousand) −0.200* −0.207* −0.197* −0.170 −0.385** −0.197
(0.110) (0.112) (0.111) (0.108) (0.166) (0.205)
ROA −0.821** −0.787* −0.847** −0.00207 −1.682* −1.763
(0.412) (0.420) (0.397) (0.943) (0.948) (1.798)
Liquid assets 0.394 0.460 0.351 −0.164 0.409 0.540
(0.752) (0.681) (0.655) (0.857) (1.097) (1.546)
Deposits/Total Assets −1.185*** −1.037*** −1.206*** −0.964** −1.210** −3.004***
(0.296) (0.380) (0.367) (0.440) (0.481) (0.652)
MFI-specific variables
WB 0.862*** 0.795* 0.883** 1.187** 0.291 0.988*
(0.299) (0.409) (0.416) (0.475) (0.470) (0.547)
Donations (dummy) −0.276 −0.262 −0.293* −0.365* −0.440
(0.175) (0.160) (0.163) (0.203) (0.310)
Regulated −0.276 −0.292* −0.275* −0.235 0.204 −0.244
(0.176) (0.169) (0.165) (0.227) (0.211) (0.318)
NBdev 0.00769 0.00243 0.00890 0.00846 0.00814 0.321***
(0.00665) (0.00554) (0.00601) (0.00547) (0.00674) (0.0955)
Control variables
logaAssets 0.190*** 0.175*** 0.194*** 0.231*** 0.260*** 0.283***
(0.0635) (0.0435) (0.0443) (0.0568) (0.0722) (0.0901)
log(AVLS) −0.0768 −0.0604 −0.0818 −0.0796 −0.258** 0.00159
(0.120) (0.0941) (0.0977) (0.110) (0.124) (0.141)
For-profit −0.142 −0.0925 −0.146 −0.197 −0.126 −0.329
(0.222) (0.210) (0.204) (0.222) (0.300) (0.289)
TYPE_NGO −0.561** −0.539** −0.552** −0.405 −0.744**
(0.246) (0.219) (0.222) (0.324) (0.361)
Region LAC 0.359 0.525 0.348 0.132 0.715* 0.113
(0.334) (0.332) (0.313) (0.414) (0.392) (0.470)
GDPpc (in thousand USD) −0.168*** −0.182** −0.166** −0.226*** −0.134 −0.111
(0.0590) (0.0718) (0.0687) (0.0689) (0.0830) (0.0851)
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.0687** 0.0501 0.0681** 0.0579** 0.0928** 0.0576
(0.0319) (0.0313) (0.0281) (0.0254) (0.0369) (0.0411)
CropI −0.0352*** −0.0382*** −0.0354*** −0.0335*** −0.0431*** −0.0351***
(0.00828) (0.00608) (0.00587) (0.00676) (0.0104) (0.0102)
Gini index −0.00749 −0.0138 −0.00693 −0.0225 −0.0194 −0.00139
(0.0159) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0161) (0.0147) (0.0219)
Poverty rate 0.00764 0.00791 0.00659 0.0108 0.000979 0.00372
(0.00848) (0.00797) (0.00786) (0.00759) (0.00916) (0.0162)
Comp −0.00355 −0.0123 −0.00157 −0.00223 0.00372 0.0259
(0.0216) (0.0169) (0.0156) (0.0203) (0.0212) (0.0302)
Value of shares traded 0.00666***
(0.00228)
Domestic credit provided by banking sector −0.00172
(0.00245)
Constant −0.483 0.167 −0.418 −0.734 0.845 −2.743
(0.946) (1.102) (1.101) (1.388) (1.422) (2.166)
Observations 1797 1797 1797 1140 885 762
Failures 39 39 39 28 24 20
Pseudo-R2 0.240 0.251 0.240 0.294 0.292 0.373
AIC 331.8 329.7 333.6 229.6 200.1 162.1
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cant positive effect on the probability of failure. Regarding microfinance-specific
factors, our findings also prove to be consistent with our main results. Only the co-
efficient of the donations dummy and/or the regulation dummy is insignificant for
several model specifications. The negative sign of the presence of donations indi-
cates that either potential requirements by donors are met or that donors support
MFIs facing financial distress. Due to the reduced sample size, in particular, the
loss of several failures, the results of model specifications (R.IX)–(R.XI) should
be interpreted carefully. Overall, the findings of the three subsample regressions
appear to correspond well to the previous findings regarding FAILURE1. Model
specification (R.XI) might be of special interest to investors intending to provide
MFIs with large funding volumes, for example microfinance investment funds.
The significant positive coefficient of NBdev in the subsample without small MFIs
indicates that an excessive growth of MFIs may increase the probability of failure
as hypothesized in H5.
The failure probability could be different for MFIs with high data quality com-
pared to MFIs with low data quality, because MFIs with low data quality could
tend to withhold information regarding the possibility of failure. To examine this
effect, we construct an index based on 17 MFI-specific variables obtained from
MIX Market that are important for our analysis. This data quality indicator, DQI,
represents the portion of these variables that is missing for each MFI. A value for
DQI of zero implies that none of the 17 figures is missing and the respective MFI
exhibits a very high quality of data.
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Table 10: Robustness checks considering data quality effects employing the FAILURE1 data set.
Coefficients of the probit models based on model specification (V). The dependent variable is the
FAILURE1 dummy. The regression for model (R.XII) is performed using Eicker–Huber–White
heteroskedastic-consistent errors. The other regressions employ DQI-clustered standard errors.
Standard errors are in parentheses. In model (R.XIV) the clusters are categorized in the following
five groups: 0 ≤ DQI < 0.0196, 0.0196 ≤ DQI < 0.1176, 0.1176 ≤ DQI < 0.2353, 0.2353 ≤
DQI < 0.3529, and DQI ≥ 0.3529. In model (R.XV) the clusters are classified in the following
six groups: 0 ≤ DQI < .0196, 0.0196 ≤ DQI < 0.1176, 0.1176 ≤ DQI < 0.2157, 0.2157 ≤ DQI
< 0.3137, 0.3137 ≤ DQI < 0.4118, and DQI ≥ 0.4118. The symbols *, **, and *** express
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variables are defined in Table 2.
(R.XII) (R.XIII) (R.XIV) (R.XV)
DQI Clustered SEs Clustered SEs Clustered SEs
indicators (4 DQI clusters) (5 DQI clusters) (6 DQI clusters)
CAMELS components
CAP −0.841*** −0.816*** −0.816*** −0.816**
(0.232) (0.268) (0.253) (0.336)
PAR30 0.911** 0.858 0.858 0.858
(0.399) (0.653) (0.749) (0.661)
LLR 2.252* 2.054* 2.054* 2.054**
(1.241) (1.240) (1.071) (0.971)
Borrowers per staff member (in thousand) −0.211* −0.200** −0.200** −0.200***
(0.120) (0.0787) (0.0900) (0.0742)
ROA −0.836** −0.821 −0.821 −0.821
(0.387) (0.684) (0.617) (0.554)
Liquid assets 0.528 0.394 0.394*** 0.394
(0.675) (0.264) (0.139) (0.261)
Deposits/Total Assets −1.234*** −1.185** −1.185*** −1.185***
(0.415) (0.501) (0.354) (0.441)
MFI-specific variables
WB 0.811** 0.862*** 0.862* 0.862**
(0.401) (0.325) (0.463) (0.391)
Donations (dummy) −0.290 −0.276 −0.276* −0.276*
(0.177) (0.180) (0.166) (0.144)
Regulated −0.263 −0.276* −0.276* −0.276
(0.164) (0.161) (0.161) (0.177)
NBdev 0.00872 0.00769** 0.00769** 0.00769*
(0.00581) (0.00336) (0.00385) (0.00423)
Control variables
logaAssets 0.198*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190***
(0.0520) (0.0385) (0.0326) (0.0324)
log(AVLS) −0.0819 −0.0768 −0.0768 −0.0768
(0.0947) (0.108) (0.0984) (0.0688)
For-profit −0.160 −0.142 −0.142 −0.142
(0.207) (0.0890) (0.186) (0.125)
TYPE_NGO −0.581*** −0.561*** −0.561*** −0.561***
(0.224) (0.0442) (0.123) (0.155)
Region LAC 0.359 0.359 0.359* 0.359***
(0.317) (0.299) (0.203) (0.110)
GDPpc (in thousand USD) −0.172*** −0.168* −0.168** −0.168**
(0.0655) (0.0953) (0.0727) (0.0820)
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.0686** 0.0687* 0.0687** 0.0687*
(0.0308) (0.0356) (0.0321) (0.0351)
CropI −0.0343*** −0.0352*** −0.0352*** −0.0352***
(0.00592) (0.00788) (0.00737) (0.00615)
Gini index −0.00420 −0.00749 −0.00749 −0.00749
(0.0119) (0.0173) (0.0133) (0.0119)
Poverty rate 0.00603 0.00764 0.00764 0.00764
(0.00774) (0.00577) (0.00567) (0.00519)
Comp −0.00172 −0.00355 −0.00355 −0.00355
(0.0174) (0.00791) (0.0159) (0.0108)
Very high DQ 0.152
(DQI< 0.0392) (0.305)
High DQ 0.118
(0.0392≤ DQI < 0.1961) (0.298)
Moderate DQ 0.435
(0.1961≤ DQI < 0.3235) (0.268)
Constant −0.918 −0.483 −0.483 −0.483
(1.241) (1.518) (1.447) (0.978)
Observations 1797 1797 1797 1797
Failures 39 39 39 39
Pseudo-R2 0.249 0.240 0.240 0.240
AIC 334.3 291.8 293.8 295.8
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Table 10 shows the results for model specifications including dummy variables
for various categories of data quality (very high, high, and moderate) with low
data quality as reference category. Furthermore, this table presents regressions
with DQI-clustered standard errors. Model specification (R.XIII) considers four
clusters corresponding to the four categories in model specification (R.XII). The
model specifications (R.XIV) and (R.XV) account for five and six DQI-clusters,
respectively. While the inclusion of data quality dummies has no effect on our
conclusions regarding the CAMELS components and microfinance-specific as-
pects, DQI-clustered standard errors lead to insignificant coefficients for the ROA
and PAR30. However, the signs of the coefficients remain unchanged. For the
microfinance-specific variables, we observe a significant positive effect of NBdev
on the probability of failure in all three model specifications with DQI-clustered
standard errors. Moreover, the negative sign of regulation is significant in model
specifications (R.XIII) and (R.XIV), and the coefficient of the donations dummy
shows a significant negative sign in (R.XIV) and (R.XV). Therefore, we are able
to detect certain evidence to support H5 in the robustness analyses regarding data
quality effects.
Table 11 investigates the impact of endogeneity issues that could arise regard-
ing ROA. Note that in all regressions MFI cost factors are captured indirectly via
the ROA. In particular, the cost factor financial expenses can be considered to
be a source of endogeneity because creditors typically set the interest rates in a
way to account for expected losses. To deal with this possible endogeneity, we
perform probit regressions with endogenous explanatory variables. The structural
and the reduced form equations of the IV-probit models are estimated jointly using
maximum likelihood. Column two of Table 11 presents a just-identified model,
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Table 11: Robustness checks considering endogeneity issues employing the FAILURE1 data set.
Estimated coefficients based on model specification (V). The dependent variable is the FAILURE1
dummy. Model specification (R.XVII) employs the operating expenses divided by average assets
as sole instrumental variable. Model specification (R.XVIII) additionally considers the lending
interest rate in a country. The regression is performed using Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-
consistent errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** express signifi-






CAP −0.793*** −0.742*** −0.745***
(0.235) (0.241) (0.246)
PAR30 0.848** 0.829** 0.828**
(0.405) (0.404) (0.405)
LLR 2.132* 1.999 1.995
(1.239) (1.276) (1.281)
Borrowers per staff member (in thousand) −0.200 −0.205* −0.203*
(0.127) (0.123) (0.123)
ROA −0.776* −1.107** −1.096**
(0.425) (0.536) (0.549)
Liquid assets 0.484 0.426 0.422
(0.681) (0.667) (0.667)
Deposits/Total Assets −1.132*** −1.122*** −1.121***
(0.367) (0.371) (0.371)
MFI-specific variables
WB 0.837** 0.837** 0.841**
(0.408) (0.409) (0.409)
Donations (dummy) −0.328** −0.348** −0.346**
(0.166) (0.165) (0.165)
Regulated −0.289* −0.286* −0.286*
(0.165) (0.165) (0.165)
NBdev 0.0443 0.0409 0.0412
(0.0365) (0.0372) (0.0375)
Control variables
logaAssets 0.187*** 0.194*** 0.195***
(0.0456) (0.0436) (0.0427)
log(AVLS) −0.0851 −0.0900 −0.0903
(0.0982) (0.0981) (0.0974)
For-profit −0.159 −0.167 −0.166
(0.208) (0.205) (0.206)
TYPE_NGO −0.595*** −0.599*** −0.600***
(0.226) (0.224) (0.224)
Region LAC 0.353 0.351 0.351
(0.318) (0.315) (0.316)
GDPpc (in thousand USD) −0.173** −0.176** −0.176**
(0.0710) (0.0708) (0.0701)
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.0735** 0.0736** 0.0735**
(0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0311)
CropI −0.0355*** −0.0354*** −0.0357***
(0.00625) (0.00623) (0.00627)
Gini index −0.00471 −0.00538 −0.00553
(0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Poverty rate 0.00729 0.00750 0.00764
(0.00831) (0.00832) (0.00841)
Comp −0.00620 −0.00414 −0.00431
(0.0172) (0.0162) (0.0164)
Constant −0.404 −0.458 −0.440
(1.112) (1.121) (1.127)
Observations 1642 1642 1642
Failures 39 39 39
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.4335 0.4832
in which we employ the operating expenses divided by average assets as an in-
strumental variable. This is economically sound because operating expenses are
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usually not driven by the solvency of an MFI. Furthermore, we investigate an
over-identified model with the lending interest rate in the country in which the
MFI operates as an additional instrumental variable. Because ROA is the depen-
dent variable in the first-stage regression in the models with endogenous regres-
sors, we drop all observations with imputed values for ROA. The resulting data set
consists of 1642 MFIs, while none of the observations from MFIs that have failed
is lost. Column one of Table 11 exhibits estimated coefficients for the standard
probit model employing this reduced data set. In the resulting probit models with
endogenous regressors, the conclusions regarding H1–H5 are robust compared to
model (V). Solely the positive coefficient of LLR is insignificant. However, the
high p-values of the Wald test of exogeneity in the IV-probit models indicate that
standard probit regressions appear to be more appropriate.
3.4. Discussion
As our results indicate, the factors driving failures of MFIs are similar to tradi-
tional banks. The significant negative relationship between the capital asset ratio
and the likelihood of failure is consistent with studies examining financial distress
(e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Koetter et al., 2007; Arena, 2008; Jin et al.,
2011; Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). Additionally, our results show a significant
positive effect of (bad) asset quality, already detected in several previous stud-
ies on the failures of traditional banks (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1998; Wheelock
and Wilson, 2000; Kerstein and Kozberg, 2013). Our findings on the measure
for earnings significantly show the expected negative sign. This relationship has
also been determined, for example, by Cole and Gunther (1998), Koetter et al.
(2007), Arena (2008), Cole and White (2012), and Kerstein and Kozberg (2013)
for traditional banks.
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While we are not able to identify a significant relationship between the liq-
uidity and the probability of failure, previous studies on commercial banks show
mixed results for this CAMELS component. For example, Koetter et al. (2007)
find a significant positive relationship (for distressed targets). However, the re-
spective findings of Arena (2008) are not significant for the sample of Latin Amer-
ican banks. Similarly, Koetter et al. (2007) obtain insignificant results concerning
liquidity for distressed acquirers. Regarding the described varying previous find-
ings for commercial banks, we conclude that, although insignificant, our finding
for the liquidity as a predictor for failure is in accordance with the results of stud-
ies on traditional banks’ failures.
In contrast to Kerstein and Kozberg (2013), our findings show a significant
negative relationship between the ratio of deposits to total assets and the failure
probability. However, our results considering the sensitivity to market risk are
consistent with H1. Overall, our results seem to be consistent with previous liter-
ature on traditional banks.
Additionally, we obtain results concerning the influence of MFI-specific vari-
ables. The failure probability increases with a higher ratio of female customers.
This finding is in line with Hermes et al. (2011), who detect a negative relationship
between female borrowers and efficiency of the MFI. Our main results in Table 7
and several robustness analyses show that, depending on the respective model
specification or subsample employed, regulation, the presence of donations, and
the growth of the MFIs could also affect the probability of failure. Specifically,
regulation and donations seem to reduce the likelihood of failure, while a too fast
growth is associated with an increasing failure probability. Overall, we are able to
confirm H2, but we also observe evidence in favour of H3–H5.
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4. Conclusion
Although being of high importance for microfinance actors and the academic
community, the subject of MFI failures has so far been under-researched. In
this article, we study the determinants of failures based on the CAMELS compo-
nents, microfinance-specific variables, and several control variables using a cate-
gorical regression model with probit specification and apply Eicker–Huber–White
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Our findings confirm that many results
from standard banking studies are also applicable to MFIs, with the main result
in this regard being that of the CAMELS components the capital adequacy (C),
the asset quality (A), the management capability (M), the earnings (E), and the
sensitivity to market risk (S) can be confirmed as being explanatory factors of the
probability of failure.
Regarding MFI-specific variables, the percentage of female borrowers appears
to have a positive influence on the failure probability. Our results also indicate a
significant relationship between the other microfinance-specific variables and the
probability of failure in several model specifications. For example, we find evi-
dence of a negative influence on the failure probability concerning the regulation
and the presence of donations, as well as a positive influence of the growth of an
MFI. Although we do not have any concrete indications, it is possible that remain-
ing endogeneity problems in our data set could also exist.
We can derive several policy implications from our findings. First, the result
that regulation appears to lower the probability of failure can be interpreted as
a recommendation for policy makers to implement mechanisms that increase the
share of regulated MFIs. Second, our results indicate that rapid growth of MFIs
should be observed critically by regulators and other stakeholders. The same ad-
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vice applies to MFIs with a high share of female borrowers as these MFIs are also
more susceptible to failure risk.
As suggestions for further research we would like to point to the fact that in
the recent years dating from 2011 onwards, there are indications of further failures
of MFIs not contained in our sample. Once these data can be utilized it would
make sense to set up new categories for failures, i.e. classical debt default and
closures by the regulatory authority. From an investor perspective, for the case
of defaults it would be very interesting to analyse the losses accompanying the
respective failures. Finally, the findings of this paper can be integrated into credit
risk models, which are of increasing importance for microfinance investors and
intermediaries initiating and managing microfinance investment vehicles.
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Appendix A. Technical details on failure classification
We classify MFIs as failed, non-failed, and unsolved with respect to a refer-
ence year RY and in accordance with the two failure definitions shown in Section
2.2, where the reference year is the point in time with a failure indication.
Classification algorithm for failures according to the strict definition (FAIL-
URE1).
(1) If the MFI stopped reporting to MIX Market at some point in time t (t refers
to the year after the last report), continue, else go to step (2).
(a) If there are signs for bankruptcy, restructuring, closing of the MFI
by a regulatory authority in t or afterwards, then set FAILURE1 = 1,
RY = t, else continue.
(b) If the MFI was subject to a merger in t or afterwards, continue, else go
to step (c).
If the MFI’s CARt−1 ≤ 0.02 (indicates a merger after financial dis-
tress), then set FAILURE1 = 1, RY = t−1. Else, set FAILURE1 = 0,
RY = t.
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(c) If there are other reasons for the break in the MFIs reporting history or
evidence that the MFI still operates, then set FAILURE1 = 0, RY = t,
else continue.
(d) If the reasons for the break in the MFIs reporting history cannot be
solved, then the MFI is classified as unsolved.
(2) If the MFI was subject to a restructuring at some point in time t, then set
FAILURE1 = 1, RY = t, else set FAILURE1 = 0, RY = 2011.
The situation of several MFIs examined remained unsolved (1.d) either due to
lack of availability of information or because the information could not be evalu-
ated for linguistic reasons. Furthermore, we examined two MFIs reporting a cap-
ital asset ratio of zero to MIX Market more closely. For one of these MFIs rating
reports for the respective years have been available. These rating reports showed
values for the capital asset ratio that were different from the values reported to
MIX Market. We classify this MFI as unsolved.
Classification algorithm for failures according to the extended definition (FAIL-
URE2).
(1) Generate FAILURE1 according to the algorithm shown above.
(2) If FAILURE1 = 1 then set FAILURE2 = 1, RY = RYFAILURE1. Else, con-
tinue.
(3) If CARt ≤ 0.02 for some point time t and all periods afterwards, then set
FAILURE2 = 1, RY = t. Else, set FAILURE2 = 0, RY = 2011.
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Appendix B. Additional tables (not for publication)
Table B.12: Absolute and relative frequencies for categorical variables based on the unimputed
data sets for the strict definition of failure (FAILURE1) and unsolved cases. The variables are
defined in Table 2.
FAILURE1 Unsolved cases
(without unsolved cases) (excluded from FAILURE1)
absolute relative absolute relative
Type
Bank 161 0.09 4 0.02
Credit Union 300 0.17 106 0.40
NBFI 515 0.29 49 0.19
NGO 657 0.37 57 0.22
Other 164 0.09 48 0.18
Region
Africa 450 0.25 60 0.23
East Asia and the Pacific 220 0.12 44 0.17
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 272 0.15 111 0.42
Latin America and The Caribbean 455 0.25 15 0.06
Middle East and North Africa 73 0.04 2 0.01
South Asia 327 0.18 32 0.12
Regulated
No 672 0.37 110 0.42
Yes 1047 0.58 141 0.53
No information 78 0.04 13 0.05
Operational self-sufficiency
No 535 0.30 76 0.29
Yes 1153 0.64 175 0.66
No information 109 0.06 13 0.05
Profit status
Non-profit 1,012 0.56 154 0.58
Profit 681 0.38 65 0.25
No information 104 0.06 45 0.17
Deposits
No 614 0.34 53 0.20
Yes 1006 0.56 130 0.49
No information 177 0.10 81 0.31
Donations
No 885 0.49 141 0.53
Yes 747 0.42 98 0.37
No information 165 0.09 25 0.09
Total 1,797 1.00 264 1.00
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Table B.13: Descriptive statistics for metric variables based on the unimputed data set for the
strict definition of failure, FAILURE1 (Panel A) and the unsolved cases (Panel B). The variables
are defined in Table 2.
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel A: FAILURE1 1797
CAP 1758 0.314 0.291 −3.639 0.137 0.243 0.457 1.000
WOR 1542 0.022 0.048 −0.010 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.577
LLR 1620 0.018 0.046 −0.323 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.563
PAR30 1572 0.081 0.126 0.000 0.017 0.046 0.094 2.350
PAR90 1401 0.055 0.085 0.000 0.009 0.029 0.063 0.933
OE 1641 0.195 0.181 0.000 0.095 0.145 0.236 2.782
Borrowers per staff member 1724 134.723 259.006 0.000 56.000 101.000 157.167 8191.667
ROA 1642 −0.009 0.154 −2.930 −0.016 0.015 0.043 0.577
Profit margin 1662 −0.098 0.753 −9.656 −0.100 0.086 0.194 1.423
NOI 1666 −0.008 0.152 −2.930 −0.018 0.018 0.048 0.485
Deposits/Total Assets 1590 0.244 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.466 0.973
Liquid assets 1517 0.170 0.131 0.000 0.080 0.136 0.222 0.846
NB (in thousands) 1747 56.982 361.502 0.000 1.634 6.579 23.036 7498.742
NBdev 1514 0.415 3.823 −0.966 −0.022 0.109 0.320 142.000
Assets (mn USD) 1767 36.337 167.286 0.000 0.900 3.276 13.738 3553.838
AVLS 1735 1133.627 1816.088 1.000 156.500 440.333 1260.500 14825.000
Donations/Average Assets 1644 0.037 0.149 −0.035 0.000 0.000 0.010 3.472
WB 1537 0.637 0.267 0.000 0.424 0.623 0.897 1.000
DQI 1797 0.176 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.314 0.941
GDPpc 1784 2715.224 2753.615 121.014 762.747 1251.168 3865.162 17142.119
Comp 1793 6.660 4.403 1.000 3.442 5.161 10.754 21.839
CropI 1782 109.752 13.199 62.140 102.335 109.130 116.360 215.285
Poverty rate 1061 32.652 12.927 2.900 24.900 32.367 39.800 80.700
Domestic credit provided by financial sector 1706 45.410 30.387 −19.142 22.695 42.006 60.829 184.570
Value of shares traded 1289 20.300 32.806 0.002 1.102 4.386 20.398 157.419
Gini index 1106 42.238 8.693 26.975 33.380 42.980 48.713 67.400
Lending interest rate 1449 15.441 9.514 5.396 10.833 13.783 17.973 203.961
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1784 3.370 2.854 −9.410 1.303 3.263 4.987 21.722
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel B: Unsolved Cases 264
CAP 259 0.323 0.370 −2.966 0.118 0.243 0.525 1.000
WOR 227 0.008 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.220
LLR 237 0.032 0.372 −0.042 0.000 0.000 0.004 5.717
PAR30 232 0.077 0.116 0.000 0.009 0.039 0.092 0.865
PAR90 172 0.055 0.087 0.000 0.004 0.023 0.066 0.546
OE 242 0.213 0.291 0.000 0.077 0.135 0.229 2.479
Borrowers per staff member 246 91.636 101.187 0.000 30.000 52.417 122.500 617.000
ROA 243 0.000 0.246 −2.153 −0.015 0.023 0.075 0.476
Profit margin 218 −0.035 0.806 −7.730 −0.061 0.132 0.273 0.728
NOI 218 0.013 0.231 −2.473 −0.012 0.031 0.078 0.457
Deposits/Total Assets 182 0.414 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.382 0.765 0.986
Liquid assets 173 0.133 0.142 0.000 0.028 0.084 0.174 0.757
NB (in thousands) 251 4.469 15.095 0.000 0.287 0.913 3.204 180.828
NBdev 171 0.577 2.319 −0.829 −0.046 0.105 0.457 24.250
Assets (mn USD) 260 1.985 4.266 0.000 0.167 0.771 1.989 46.166
AVLS 243 1646.481 2556.438 1.000 166.000 698.000 1953.000 14865.667
Donations/Average Assets 237 0.073 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 2.666
WB 227 0.588 0.260 0.000 0.418 0.585 0.766 1.000
DQI 264 0.274 0.171 0.000 0.176 0.275 0.353 0.882
GDPpc 263 3484.404 3689.310 100.818 707.506 1567.536 6511.967 10423.319
Comp 263 5.638 3.582 1.157 3.162 4.463 6.995 15.812
CropI 264 105.574 8.476 69.933 100.000 106.005 110.413 143.547
Poverty rate 151 30.022 16.743 8.900 16.600 27.600 39.900 72.000
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 248 37.690 28.883 0.783 23.010 28.323 46.047 172.083
Value of shares traded 232 26.157 29.161 0.010 2.209 18.054 45.953 171.990
Gini index 176 39.472 6.201 28.190 34.010 40.760 42.990 58.627
Lending interest rate 211 16.593 9.887 5.310 11.129 13.730 17.454 66.885
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 263 4.439 3.047 −13.080 2.209 4.572 7.100 21.722
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Table B.14: Descriptive statistics for metric variables based on the imputed data set for the strict
definition of failure (FAILURE1). The variables are defined in Table 2.
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel C: Full sample 1797
CAP 1797 0.314 0.288 −3.639 0.138 0.251 0.450 1.000
WOR 1797 0.022 0.045 −0.010 0.000 0.010 0.022 0.577
LLR 1797 0.018 0.043 −0.323 0.000 0.006 0.018 0.563
PAR30 1797 0.081 0.117 0.000 0.020 0.055 0.083 2.350
PAR90 1797 0.055 0.075 0.000 0.014 0.044 0.055 0.933
OE 1797 0.195 0.173 0.000 0.099 0.156 0.222 2.782
Borrowers per staff member 1797 134.723 253.688 0.000 58.000 104.667 153.500 8191.667
ROA 1797 −0.009 0.147 −2.930 −0.011 0.012 0.039 0.577
Profit margin 1797 −0.098 0.724 −9.656 −0.098 0.069 0.182 1.423
NOI 1797 −0.008 0.146 −2.930 −0.013 0.014 0.045 0.485
Deposits/Total Assets 1797 0.244 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.169 0.405 0.973
Liquid assets 1797 0.170 0.121 0.000 0.090 0.164 0.203 0.846
NB (in thousands) 1747 56.982 361.502 0.000 1.634 6.579 23.036 7498.742
NBdev 1797 0.415 3.509 −0.966 0.000 0.176 0.414 142.000
Assets (mn USD) 1767 36.337 167.286 0.000 0.900 3.276 13.738 3553.838
AVLS 1797 1133.794 1784.466 1.000 161.500 474.667 1228.667 14825.000
Donations/Average Assets 1797 0.037 0.143 −0.035 0.000 0.000 0.025 3.472
WB 1797 0.637 0.247 0.000 0.463 0.637 0.850 1.000
DQI 1797 0.176 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.314 0.941
GDPpc 1797 2715.229 2743.631 121.014 762.747 1251.168 3865.162 17142.119
Comp 1797 6.660 4.398 1.000 3.478 5.170 10.754 21.839
CropI 1797 109.752 13.144 62.140 102.350 109.260 116.360 215.285
Poverty rate 1797 32.652 9.931 2.900 29.800 32.652 34.400 80.700
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 1797 45.412 29.608 −19.142 24.011 44.387 60.829 184.570
Value of shares traded 1797 20.330 27.782 0.002 2.063 14.198 20.406 157.419
Gini index 1797 42.238 6.818 26.975 39.790 42.238 45.530 67.400
Lending interest rate 1797 15.439 8.543 5.396 11.278 14.927 16.481 203.961
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1797 3.370 2.844 −9.410 1.385 3.263 4.889 21.722
Quantiles
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Panel D: Failed MFIs 39
CAP 39 0.144 0.180 −0.206 0.058 0.120 0.245 0.713
WOR 39 0.032 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.034 0.243
LLR 39 0.031 0.048 −0.007 0.000 0.015 0.034 0.243
PAR30 39 0.121 0.119 0.000 0.033 0.081 0.175 0.438
PAR90 39 0.097 0.115 0.000 0.030 0.055 0.147 0.466
OE 39 0.199 0.158 0.019 0.089 0.134 0.290 0.666
Borrowers per staff member 39 164.859 131.862 16.500 74.000 134.723 224.000 466.333
ROA 39 −0.050 0.135 −0.509 −0.128 −0.015 0.038 0.177
Profit margin 39 −0.279 0.693 −2.489 −0.601 −0.097 0.124 1.024
NOI 39 −0.047 0.133 −0.450 −0.097 −0.008 0.042 0.185
Deposits/Total Assets 39 0.149 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.244 0.694
Liquid assets 39 0.198 0.138 0.007 0.102 0.170 0.272 0.692
NB (in thousands) 38 177.950 447.208 0.521 5.364 12.842 84.175 2233.332
NBdev 39 0.553 1.260 −0.490 −0.050 0.227 0.681 6.683
Assets (mn USD) 39 52.879 99.307 0.042 0.992 6.011 39.053 397.776
AVLS 39 793.850 1166.755 36.000 146.000 230.000 1089.667 4761.333
Donations/Average Assets 39 0.039 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.376
WB 39 0.727 0.252 0.130 0.595 0.693 1.000 1.000
DQI 39 0.154 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.294 0.471
GDPpc 39 1467.031 1722.690 255.298 447.961 1119.172 1176.748 9402.997
Comp 39 7.313 4.417 1.000 2.920 5.467 11.711 15.667
CropI 39 104.064 11.279 67.415 99.850 105.120 114.287 116.360
Poverty rate 39 34.437 8.191 9.000 29.800 32.652 38.800 61.700
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 39 46.704 27.684 2.402 17.268 60.016 70.341 96.037
Value of shares traded 39 32.336 29.636 0.002 7.388 20.406 76.168 85.057
Gini index 39 40.296 5.807 27.820 38.990 42.238 42.238 50.550
Lending interest rate 39 15.885 11.472 7.600 11.278 13.996 16.209 83.468
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 39 4.057 3.080 −5.900 1.947 3.932 5.729 8.834
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